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Our research aims to quantify the impact of protest size on the 
probability of legislative change. Specifically, we formulate a 
formal two-period model to explain the behaviour of legislators 
when faced with a variety of protest turnouts and preferences 
of the median voter. We theorise that legislator payoffs are non-
linearly affected by (1) the size of protests; (2) the preferences 
of the median voter; and (3) the legislator’s own preferences 
toward policy and civil unrest. Instead of being purely office-
seeking, a legislator’s payoff is negatively impacted by civil 
unrest which allows turnouts that represent a lower proportion 
of the electorate to still have large impacts on behaviour. Our 
study takes place within the context of anti-nuclear energy 
protests in the United States throughout the 1970s and 80s. 
Legislative change is operationalised via the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) budget, which is debated and voted upon 
in the House and Senate. The NRC is an independent agency 
established in 1974 and tasked with protecting public health and 
safety related to nuclear energy. We use a lagged time series 
model to estimate the impact of protests on the proceeding 
year’s NRC budget.
